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I. LEADING OFF: THE GAME OF BASEBALL AND THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL
A. Welcome to Today's Game
Shoeless Joe Jackson: What's with the lights?
Ray Kinsella: Oh, all the stadiums have them now.
Even Wrigley Field.
Shoeless Joe: Makes it harder to see the ball.
Ray Kinsella: Yeah, well the owners found that
more people could attend night
games.
Shoeless Joe (shaking his head): Sheesh, owners.]
For most of its history, the game of baseball has been able to coexist with
the business of Major League Baseball (MLB). Over the years, club owners
have, on occasion, made noteworthy business decisions at the expense of their
team's competitiveness. For example, the Red Sox sold Babe Ruth to the
Yankees, 2 and Connie Mack sold off his famed $100,000.00 infield.3 More
recently in 1976, Charlie Finley attempted to sell three prominent players that
had led his Oakland Athletics (A's) to consecutive World Championships
from 1972 to 1974.4 Consider also Bill Veeck's failed "Disco Demolition"
promotion in 1979, which filled the ballpark with fans, but caused his Chicago
1. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).
2. Frederick Ivor-Campbell, Team Histories, in TOTAL BASEBALL 15, 20 (John Thorn et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1995). Red Sox owner Harry Frazee was a New York theatrical entrepreneur. To cover losses
that he incurred in the theater, Frazee sold off key baseball players with Babe Ruth being the most
significant one. Frazee sold the Bambino to the New York Yankees for $100,000.00 and a
$300,000.00 mortgage on Fenway Park. Id.
3. Wilfred Sheed, Manager: Mr. Mack and the Main Chance, in THE ULTIMATE BASEBALL
BOOK 105, 113 (Daniel Okrent & Harris Lewine eds., 1991). Despite winning the 1914 American
League Pennant, Mack's Philadelphia Athletics reportedly lost $65,000.00 and saw a significant
reduction in attendance. Mack recouped his losses by selling off his star players, most notably future
Hall-of-Fame second baseman Eddie Collins for $50,000.00. "Mack groaned mightily over his
payroll ... [and] would have traded his mother to keep it down to size." Id.
4. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
876 (1978). Finley attempted to sell Joe Rudi and Rollie Fingers to the Boston Red Sox and Vida
Blue to the New York Yankees. Commissioner Bowie Kuhn blocked the proposed sales on the
grounds that they were not in the best interest of baseball. The Seventh Circuit upheld Kuhn's
actions. Id. at 531.
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White Sox to forfeit a game.5 The context in which the business of baseball
and the game of baseball most notably have conflicted, however, has centered
on the relationship between club owners and players. The 1919 Black Sox
scandal, in which eight players on the Chicago White Sox, including Shoeless
Joe Jackson, were accused of throwing the World Series, stemmed in large
part from the low salaries and frugal ownership practices of team owner
Charles Comiskey.6 Although labor disputes have caused work stoppages
7
and lawsuits that have reached the Supreme Court,8 they never seemingly
permanently interfered with the success of baseball, either as a competitive
endeavor or as a business one.
The players' strike from 1994 to 1995, coupled with the owners' decision
to cancel the 1994 World Series, changed the relationship between the game of
baseball and its business aspects. Before 1994 the business generally seemed
to operate in the background. Since then, however, the business has been at
least as prominent as the game itself, and, in some aspects, has determined
what has happened on the field. Three teams signify the extremes of MLB's
world since the 1994 strike.
At one end, the New York Yankees exemplify success-both in the
business and competitive aspects of baseball. During the period of 1995 to
1999, the Yankees were the most profitable team in the major leagues with an
aggregate net profit of $64.5 million. On the field, the Yankees have won four
World Series in five years: 1996 and 1998 to 2000. At the other end of
spectrum lie the Montreal Expos. Although one of the poorer teams in MLB,
the Expos had been able to rely on a steady stream of talented, young players
to achieve a modest degree of on-the-field success. They even had the best
5. Disco-Haters to the Barricades, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1979, at 90. The White Sox organized
the Disco Demolition promotion with two Chicago disc jockeys whose on-air gimmick at the time
centered on the phrase "Disco Sucks." As part of the promotion, fans brought disco records to the
ballpark and the disc jockeys proceeded to blow up the records in between the games of a double-
header. The field was in such poor condition after the explosion that the umpires called off the
second game and forced the White Sox to forfeit it. Id.
6. For probably the most widely known account of the 1919 Black Sox scandal, see ELIOT
ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (Henry Holt & Co. 1988)
(1963).
7. David Pietrusza, The Business of Baseball, in TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 2, at 588, 589-99.
Baseball's work stoppages include: 1972 players' strike (canceling a total of 86 games), 1976 owners'
lockout (shutting down spring training for 24 days), 1981 players' strike (baseball's first midseason
work stoppage), 1985 players' strike (two days), 1990 owners' lockout (occurring during spring
training), and 1994 players' strike (canceling the 1994 World Series and lasting into 1995 spring
training). Id.
8. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953); Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922). These cases are known as the "Baseball Trilogy."
2002]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
record in baseball in 1994 when the players' strike ended the season. Since
then, however, the Expos have been in financial turmoil and underwent a
tumultuous change in ownership. 9 In addition, the Expos have let their young
talent-such as Pedro Martinez, Larry Walker, and Moises Alou-leave via
free agency or have traded them away because the club simply could not
afford to keep the players. The third team-the Florida Marlins-has
experienced both the on-the-field success of the Yankees and the off-the-field
"fire sale" of players for business reasons similar to the Expos. The Marlins
won the 1997 World Series, thus disrupting the Yankees' string of
championships. But doing so caused the Marlins' owners to lose thirty-four
million dollars that season, thereby leading them to the business decision to
reduce their player payroll drastically.' 0 By the time the 1998 season opened,
the Marlins had traded away so many key players or let them leave via free
agency that most commentators did not give the club any chance to defend its
championship. By the time the season ended, the Marlins payroll was less
than ten million dollars and the team had the worst record in baseball." 1
These three teams, one-tenth of the current thirty major league teams,
highlight many of the problems of modem professional baseball. On the field,
a competitive gap has arisen such that at the start of any given season, only a
minority of the teams are seen as having a legitimate chance of being one of
the eight playoff teams, and an even smaller number have any real chance of
winning the World Series. Off the field, owning a major league club generally
has not been a profitable investment since the 1994 strike. During the five-
year period of 1995 to 1999, only three clubs turned a net profit.' 2 These
troubles have led MLB and commentators to seek solutions to the structural
issues underlying the problems in a hope to attempt to stem the financial and
competitive collapse of baseball.
This article seeks to add to the debate over how MLB should address its
financial and competitive problems. After examining baseball's antitrust
exemption, the article considers two comprehensive proposals to restructure
MLB's economics, including one prepared on behalf of MLB club owners, in
9. Thorn Loverro, Expos Stay in Montreal After Sale, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at B 1.
10. Larry Stone, Going... Going... Gone-Under the Financial Gun, The Florida Marlins
Continue to Dismantle a Championship Team, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at C1.
11. PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: How THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS
BETTER FOR FANS 188 (2000).
12. RICHARD C. LEVIN ET AL., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSIONER'S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL ECONOMICs (2000)
[hereinafter PANEL REPORT] (noting that the New York Yankees, Cleveland Indians, and Colorado
Rockies were the only teams to make a profit), available at
http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blueribbon.pdf.
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section II. Although these proposals offer useful mechanisms, they fall short
of addressing what needs to be the proper objective of any restructuring-
enhancing the individual clubs' profitability. Section HI compares the issues
facing baseball with those that the electric utility industry has faced over the
past decade. In doing so, the restructuring of the energy industry is examined
to derive some general principles that could be used to shape a new economic
structure for MLB. Section IV considers the impact of the proposed economic
structure on the competitive balance of the game of baseball. Finally, section
V offers a post-script assessing the off-the-field developments during the
2001-2002 off-season in light of the arguments made in this article.
B. Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
Before delving into baseball's current financial situation, one aspect of the
business of baseball merits special consideration-its exemption from federal
and state antitrust laws. 13 As will be discussed below, baseball's current
exemption reaches all aspects of the business of baseball except for matters
directly related to or affecting the employment of major league players. 14
Regardless of the merit of such an exemption, which is beyond the scope of
this article, this exemption shapes the business of baseball and may provide a
valuable resource in addressing MLB's current problems.15
Baseball's antitrust exemption developed as a result of the combination of
judicial decisions and congressional silence. The United States Supreme
Court exempted MLB from federal antitrust laws in 1922 in Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore v. National League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs.16 In the short
opinion that Justice Holmes authored, the Court concluded "[t]he business is
giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs." 17 Regardless of
other facets related to putting on exhibitions of baseball that reach across state
13. To the extent that MLB is exempt from federal antitrust laws, it also is exempt from similar
state statutes. Minn. Twins P'ship v. Minnesota, 592 N.W.2d 847, 856 (Minn. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1013 (1999) (precluding antitrust investigation by state Attorney General); State v.
Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Wis. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966) ("A
majority of this court... conclude[s] that the Wisconsin antitrust statute cannot, because of
requirements of the federal constitution, be applied .. ").
14. 15 U.S.C. § 27a (2001). This Act is commonly referred to throughout this article as the
Flood Act.
15. For a more detailed examination of baseball's antitrust exemption, see sources cited at Flood,
407 U.S. at 281 n.16; Larry C. Smith, Comment, Beyond Peanuts and Cracker Jack: The Implications
of Lifting Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 113 (1996); and Hon. Connie Mack
& Richard M. Blau, Esq., The Need for Fair Play: Repealing the Federal Baseball Antitrust
Exemption, 45 FLA. L. REv. 201 (1993).
16. 259 U.S. 200.
17. Id. at 208.
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lines-most notably the fact that MLB teams are based in different states-the
nature of the game is determined by the personal efforts of the players on the
field. Because "personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of
[interstate] commerce," the Court concluded that the federal antitrust laws did
not apply to professional baseball. 18
The Court's decision in Federal Baseball has been widely criticized over
the years, particularly in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Later courts,
contrary to Holmes' opinion, have expressly found that "[p]rofessional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce." 19 The Court
has referred to baseball's exemption as an "anomaly" 20 and refused to extend
the exemption to other similarly situated sports like professional football.21
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never eliminated baseball's antitrust
exemption.
In fact, the Supreme Court twice faced the question of whether to overturn
its decision in Federal Baseball, and in both cases the Court expressly
affirmed the decision. In Toolson v. New York Yankees, the Court in a per
curiam opinion found that "[t]he business has thus been left for thirty years to
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust
legislation." 22 The Court thus refused to apply the federal antitrust laws to
18. Id. at 209. As Holmes noted, "[tihe decision of the Court of Appeals went to the root of the
case and if correct makes it unnecessary to consider other" issues. Id. at 208. The Court of Appeals
stated:
A game of baseball is not susceptible of being transferred.... Not until [the players] come into contact
with their opponents on the baseball field and the contest opens does the game come into existence. It is
local in its beginning and in its end.... [T]he game effects no exchange of things according to the
meaning of "trade and commerce" ...
Nat'l League of Prof'I Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., 269 F. 681, 684-85
(D.C. 1920), vacated, 269 F. 681 (1921), affd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
In very prophetic words, Judge Smyth also noted:
If the reserve clause did not exist, the highly skillful players would be absorbed by the more wealthy
clubs, and thus some clubs in the league would so far outstrip others in playing ability that the contests
between the superior and inferior clubs would be uninteresting, and the public would refuse to patronize
them.
Nat '7 League of Prof l Baseball Clubs, 269 F. at 687.
19. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282; see also Toolson, 346 U.S. at 365 (Burton, J., dissenting) ("It is
interstate trade or commerce and, as such, it is subject to the Sherman Act until" Congress expressly
exempts it.).
20. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
21. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957) ("[S]ince Toolson and
Federal Baseball are still cited as controlling authority in antitrust actions involving other fields of
business, we now specifically limit the rule there established to the facts there involved, i.e., the
business of organized professional baseball.").
22. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
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MLB retroactively, as requested by the plaintiff, and instead left to Congress
the issue of whether MLB's exemption should be eliminated.23 By the time
that the Court decided Flood v. Kuhn24 in 1972, Congress had let the Federal
Baseball decision stand for fifty years and had not responded to the Toolson
Court's statement that the legislature would be responsible for overturning
baseball's exemption, if at all. The Flood Court concluded Congress' lack of
activity was "something other than mere congressional silence and
passivity. '25 Indeed, because baseball's antitrust exemption "is an established
one, and one that has been recognized" through a series of five cases, the
Court "continue[d] to be loath.., to overturn those cases judicially when
Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand for so
long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a
desire not to disapprove them legislatively."
26
In the wake of the Flood decision and continued congressional silence,
lower courts were faced with a stream of cases requiring them to assess the
scope of baseball's antitrust exemption. Specifically, the Supreme Court's
"Baseball Trilogy" involved MLB's reserve clause system, in which uniform
contracts effectively bound each major league player to the "club that has him
under contract" and that allowed each club "annually to renew [its
players'] ... contract[s] unilaterally, subject to a stated salary minimum." 27
Because Flood concluded that MLB constituted interstate commerce, an issue
arose as to whether Federal Baseball and Toolson retained any precedential
authority beyond their application to baseball's reserve system.28  The
question that lower courts faced was: Were the other aspects of the business of
baseball exempt from federal antitrust laws?
The minority view that emerged was that Flood limited baseball's
exemption to matters involving the reserve clause, and that the Supreme Court
had not established any precedent regarding other matters.29 A related line of
23. Id. ("We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the
antitrust laws it should be by legislation.").
24. Flood, 407 U.S. 258.
25. Id. at 283.
26. Id. at 282-84 (emphasis added). The five cases are: Radovich, 352 U.S. 445 (declining to
exempt professional football); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955)
(companion case to Shubert, infra, related to boxing); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955)
(declining to provide an antitrust exemption for theatrical productions); Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Fed.
Baseball, 259 U.S. 200.
27. Flood, 407 U.S. at 259 n.l.
28. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420,436 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
29. Id. at 438 (explaining that "no rule from those cases binds the lower courts as a matter of
stare decisis"); Butterworth v. National League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Fla.
1994).
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reasoning concluded that "the exemption does not provide baseball with
blanket immunity for anti-competitive behavior in every context in which it
operates," and that courts must consider whether any given matter is "central
enough to be encompassed in the baseball exemption." 30 Despite these cases,
however, the majority position was the "the Supreme Court intended to
exempt the business of baseball, not any particular facet of that
business ..."31
These decisions, from the Baseball Trilogy on down, all took place in the
absence of congressional action. But in 1998 Congress finally spoke on the
issue of baseball's antitrust exemption by passing the Flood Act.32 The Flood
Act revoked baseball's antitrust exemption in regard to "the conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements... directly relating to or affecting employment of
major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level. '33
Congress, however, clearly limited the revoked exemption to labor issues in
several ways. First and most importantly, Congress expressly stated that the
Flood Act would not change baseball's exemption in regard to all other
matters that did not directly relate to or affect major league players. 34
[Flood's] rejection of the very reason that the Court recognized such an exemption in Federal Baseball
seriously undercuts the precedential value of both Federal Baseball and Toolson. Based upon the
language and the findings in Flood, we come to the same conclusion as the Piazza court: baseball's
antitrust exemption extends only to the reserve system.
Id. at 1025.
30. Postema v. National League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1489 (S.D.N.Y
1992) (quoting Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 265 (S.D. Tex.
1982)), rev'd, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
31. Finley, 569 F.2d at 541; see also Prof I Baseball Schools & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d
1085, 1086 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("Each of the activities appellant alleged as violative of the antitrust laws
plainly concerns matters that are an integral part of the business of baseball."); Portland Baseball
Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The plaintiff's claim for relief under the
antitrust laws was properly dismissed."); Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1331,
1335 (M.D. Fla. 1999) ("This Court is bound to follow precedent favoring the broad exemption from
antitrust liability afforded the business of professional baseball."); cf Butterworth, 644 So. 2d at 1025
("There is no question that Piazza is against the great weight of federal cases regarding the scope of
the exemption.").
32. 15 U.S.C. § 27a. The Flood Act's sponsors named the legislation after Curt Flood, the St.
Louis Cardinals outfielder who challenged MLB's reserve clause system in Flood.
33. § 27a(a) (emphasis added).
34. § 27a(b).
No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for changing the application of the antitrust
laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those set forth in subsection (a). This
section does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which to challenge under the antitrust
laws... any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that do not directly relate to or affect employment of
major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level ....
[Vol. 12:631
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Congress provided a nonexclusive list of issues that do not "directly relate to
or affect" major leaguers: acts related to minor league ballplayers, the
relationship between major league and minor league baseball, business matters
relating to franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise ownership,
marketing and licensing of intellectual property; conduct protected by the
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, the relationship between professional
baseball and umpires, and the relationship between professional baseball and
those not in the business.35 Second, the Flood Act provided that only "a major
league player has standing to sue" under the statute.36 Finally, it directed that
the definition of conduct not directly relating to or affecting major leaguers
"shall not be strictly or narrowly construed. '37
Congress designed the Flood Act to bring MLB's relations with its players
under the ambit of federal antitrust laws. The effect of doing so likely will
have some bearing on future labor relations, but may or may not be of great
significance. 38 The Flood Act's real impact, however, may rest in Congress'
express statement regarding the scope of baseball's remaining antitrust
exemption. In expressly exempting the rest of the business of baseball from
antitrust laws, Congress may have believed that it simply was codifying
existing law. To a large extent it was, but the Flood Act did more. The
exemption had been based on highly criticized judicial reasoning, and some
courts in the absence of an express congressional statement on the matter
sought to find ways to limit the exemption's scope. With the Flood Act,
Congress statutorily defined the exemption, effectively overturning cases that
narrowly construed its scope, and foreclosed- a host of potential lines of attack
against MLB owners.39 As a result, MLB club owners can proceed in
virtually all non-labor related aspects of their business unimpeded by any
antitrust concerns. As Representative Asa Hutchinson (R-AR) noted during
35. § 27a(b)(1)-(6).
36. § 27a(c).
37. § 27a(d)(5).
38. Edmund P. Edmonds, The Curt FloodAct of 1998: A Hollow Gesture After All These Years?,
9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 315, 317 (1999) (asking whether the Flood Act is "anything more than a hollow
gesture to the memory of Curt Flood"); Ted Curtis, The Curt Flood Act: The Flood Act's Place in
Baseball Legal History, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 403, 412 (1999) ("It appears that the Flood Act
probably will be viewed as an RBI-producing single up the middle-a rather useful, if not wildly
dramatic, contribution towards the continued legal evolution of Major League Baseball-rather than a
heart-stopping bottom-of-the-ninth game-winning grand slam.").
39. Senator Patrick Leahy, an original co-sponsor of the Flood Act, contended that because the
Flood Act states that it does not change the current law other than in regard to major league
ballplayers, decisions like Piazza and Butterworth would still be good law. 144 CONG. REC. S9621
(daily ed. July 31, 1998). But because these cases represent a minority position and their holdings
would seem to conflict directly with the Flood Act's statutory language, it is unlikely that a court
could now reach the same conclusions under the Flood Act.
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the House debate on the Act's final passage, "this bill also recognizes the
importance of an antitrust exemption for certain aspects of the game so team
owners may continue to cooperate on issues such as league expansion,
franchise location and broadcast rights, without fear of lawsuit.
40
This exemption, therefore, is a tool available to MLB club owners in any
economic restructuring. They can pursue alternatives that generally may not
be available to other businesses, even though such alternatives all might seem
collusive, monopolistic, anti-competitive, and restrictive of the interests of
parties other than major league ballplayers. But owners also need to
remember that during much of the 1990s, many members of Congress and
commentators alike suggested revoking baseball's antitrust exemption.41
Congress likely will continue to monitor MLB's ability to address its
economic and competitive problems.42 If MLB does not effectively resolve
these issues, some future Congress could decide to eliminate MLB's
privileged position and revoke the exemption altogether.
II. BATTING SECOND: THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM, THE PROFERRED
SOLUTIONS, AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
A. The Perceived Problem: Economics Drives Competition
Turning now to the matter of MLB's current financial and competitive
problems, the first question to consider is: What is the specific problem that
needs to be addressed? This leads to other questions: How should the issue be
framed? What is the direction of the relationships between the variables? The
framing of the issue is important because how these questions are posed will
shape what factors are considered important, what goals should MLB try to
obtain, and what alternatives could MLB club owners pursue to resolve the
problems as framed.
This article focuses on two recent comprehensive efforts at identifying
MLB's problems and proposing solutions to them.43 In the first, MLB's Blue
40. 144 CONG. REC. H9945 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998).
41. Mack & Blau, supra note 15, at 201. In fact, the Flood Act originally sought to revoke
MLB's antitrust exemption subject to a few narrow exemptions.
42. Associated Press, Devine: Too Many Have-Nots in Baseball, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Nov.
21, 2000, at 4D (citing Senator Mike DeWine's concern that "baseball is not moving fast enough to
deal with" the economic disparity between baseball's large-market and small-market teams).
43. The two proposals here are not the only ones offered to restructure baseball's economic
situation, but they represent two of the most prominent and comprehensive examinations of baseball's
situation specifically. Cf WEILER, supra note 11. Weiler, a Harvard law professor, suggests that the
key for baseball is to impose a meaningful graduated salary tax that all teams must pay. Id. at 189
640 [Vol. 12:631
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Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics (MLB Panel) undertook an extensive
investigation of MLB's financial and competitive situation and released its
report on the status of baseball's economic conditions in July 2000. The
second is a book written by Emmy-winning sports broadcaster Bob Costas.
Fair Ball presents what Costas claims is a "fan's case for baseball. ' 44 Costas'
position as a sports journalist well-known for his deep love of baseball lends
his insights a high degree of credibility.
Both efforts focus on the MLB's competitive state, with the standard of
competitiveness being "a well-managed club that demonstrates baseball
acumen should allow its fans a reasonable hope that their club will be able to
play and win in the postseason." 45 They both also posit a negative relationship
between baseball's current economics and the competitive state of the game as
reflected in the simple diagram below:
Baseball economics , Competitive state of game
The MLB Panel concluded "[1]arge and growing revenue disparities exist
and are causing problems of chronic competitive imbalance. ' 46 Similarly,
Costas states "I think it's safe to say that revenue.., has become a problem
when this factor-.., more than any other single factor in the game-
becomes the biggest single indicator of a team's chances for success., 47
The relationship is one of cause and effect. The independent variable, so
to speak, is revenue disparity, most often operationalized as player payroll
disparity.48 The dependent variable is the MLB competitive balance, meaning
("The solution I favor, instead, is a set of league-wide payroll standards... that gives every club the
incentive to invest to the level needed to build a competitive team, rather than spend too much on
assembling a roster that is too strong or too little on a roster that is too weak.").
44. BOB COSTAS, FAIR BALL: A FAN'S CASE FOR BASEBALL 13 (2000) ("This isn't a
commentator's diatribe against the sport, but rather a fan's casefor baseball. What do I want? I think
the same thing most baseball fans want: To see the game prove worthy of our devotion.").
45. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 13. Costas expressed a similar notion more colorfully:
If, through a run of outrageous fortune, adversities, blunders, front-office insanity, and other
circumstances that make up their star-crossed condition, the Red Sox go 80-plus years without a world
title or the Cubs go 50-plus years without a pennant, that's part of baseball's lore. But if fans of the
Kansas City Royals or Minnesota Twins feel they're doomed to spend decades out of contention simply
because the deck is stacked against them (rather than the stars aligned against them), that's part of
baseball's problem. And that's what's happened in the economic environment of the late '90s.
COSTAS, supra note 44, at 59-60.
46. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
47. COSTAS, supra note 44, at 56.
48. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 4 ("A high payroll has become an increasingly necessary
ingredient of on-field success.").
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a "reasonable opportunity for all clubs" to achieve success in MLB's post-
season playoff, but "not equal outcome."49 With the issue framed in this way,
the rest of the analysis starts to fall into place. The goal of any restructuring
would be to improve MLB's competitive balance; to do so requires examining
alternatives that would change the nature of revenue and payroll disparities
among clubs.
In the MLB Panel's study of the first five post-strike years, MLB's
industry-wide revenues more than doubled from $1.384 billion in 1995 to
$2.786 billion in 1999. 50 In terms of the effect on club revenues, the growth in
revenue had a mixed result. On one hand, this growth slightly narrowed the
gap between the richer and poorer clubs in their average club revenue as
measured by the percentage of total club revenue. On the other hand, the
disparity in actual dollars and, thus, financial resources available to club
owners between the richer and poorer clubs became wider. (See Table 1)
Table 1: Average Club Total Revenue by Revenue Quartile51
1995 1999
Percentage* Dollars ($000,000) Percentage* Dollars ($000,000)
Quartile 1 38.7% 76.55 35.8% 131.82
Quartile 2 27.1% 53.55 27.1% 99.97
Quartile 3 19.7% 38.89 20.7% 76.23
Quartile 4 14.6% 28.86 16.4% 60.69
* "Percentage" means average club total revenue as a percentage of total
revenue of all clubs
The proportionate increases in average club revenue were not replicated in
the average payroll. (See Table 2) The average payroll for Payroll Quartile 1
teams jumped from 35.0% to 40.3% of the total payroll of all clubs, while the
average payroll for Quartile 3 dropped 2.7% and Quartile 4 dropped 3.1%.
The actual dollar gap in average payroll between Quartile 1 and Quartile 4
teams increased from $28.60 million to $58.62 million.
49. Id. at 37; CosTAs, supra note 44, at 16 ("Money is not just running the game, but whipping
it.... With every season, there seem to be more teams greeting Opening Day with little or no chance
to compete for a pennant.").
50. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 15 (Table 2: Industry Revenues).
51. Id. at 23 (Chart 6).
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Table 2: Average Payroll by Payroll Quartile52
1995 1999
Percentage* Dollars ($000,000) Percentage* Dollars ($000,000)
Quartile 1 35.0% 46.40 40.3% 78.83
Quartile 2 27.9% 36.90 28.5% 55.67
Quartile 3 23.7% 31.37 21.0% 41.03
Quartile 4 13.4% 17.80 10.3% 20.21
* "Percentage" means average club player payroll as a percentage of the
total payroll of all clubs
As these tables show, a gap between the richer and poorer clubs, already
existing in 1995, has continued to grow at least in terms of hard dollars and
particularly in relation to player payrolls. The richer clubs are paying higher
salaries for their players and, therefore presumably are able to attract and
retain the better players in the league. Based on the causal model set out by
the MLB Panel and Costas, the richer teams with the better players would be
better able to build a competitive team, and thus be more likely to achieve on-
the-field success. 53 Although both the MLB Panel and Costas are quick to
point out that a high team salary does not necessarily result in a winning
record, 54 they contend that the richer teams are more likely to have winning
seasons, participate in the playoffs, and win championships.
The empirical data since 1995 supports the correlation between the
salaries a club pays to its players and that club's on-the-field success:
* Between 1995 and 1999, teams in Payroll Quartile 1 won 58.0% of
their games; Quartile 2-53.3%, Quartile 3-46.7%, and Quartile 4-44.4%.55
0 During the same period, Payroll Quartile 1 teams won 134 of the
158 postseason playoff games and Quartile 2 won the remaining 24;
52. Id. at 27 (Chart 9).
53. But cf GEORGE F. WILL, BUNTS: CURT FLOOD, CAMDEN YARDS, PETE ROSE AND OTHER
REFLECTIONS ON BASEBALL 328 (1998) ("So far, free agency... has not had the consequence
predicted: It has not resulted in diminished competitive balance."); PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at
53 (noting that prior to the mid-1990s, free agency had not disrupted baseball's competitive balance).
54. COSTAS, supra note 44, at 57.
Now let's kill some empty rhetoric right here: Every time a big-money ballclub like the Orioles or the
Dodgers stinks up the joint, someone says that it 'proves' that money isn't that important. But the
question isn't whether big-money teams can fail.... [Some] mismanaged high-payroll teams will fail
spectacularly.
Id.
55. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 30 (Chart 11).
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only one Quartile 3 team made the playoffs during this time, losing its
only three games; and no Quartile 4 team made the playoffs between
1995 and 1999.56
o In 2000, although three teams from Payroll Quartiles 3 and 4
qualified for the playoffs and won the first three games by teams in the
bottom half of the payroll rankings since the 1994 strike, none
advanced beyond the first round; by the end of the 2000 World Series,
teams in Payroll Quartiles 1 and 2 had won 186 of the 189 postseason
games between 1995 and 2000.17
o Between 1995 and 2000, eleven of the twelve teams in the World
Series were Payroll Quartile 1 teams, including each World
Champion. 58 The 2000 World Series, for example, pitted the teams
with the highest and third highest payrolls against each other.59
Perhaps the most telling data regarding the correlation between payroll
and on-the-field success relates to the effect on head-to-head competition
among teams of disparate payrolls. As Table 3 shows, the greater the disparity
between two teams, the more likely that the team with the payroll advantage
would win. This trend holds up for both home and away games.
Table 3: Percentage of Games Won by Payroll Advantage, 199960
Payroll All 0- 26- 51- 76- 101- 126- 151- 176- 201- 226- 251- 276-
Advantage Games 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 225% 250% 275% 300%
1999 Home Games Won
%Won 1 52 60 1 60 1 61 62 61 64 65 64 68 67 68 70
1999 Visitor Games Won
%WXon 148 1 55 1 55 1 57 55 56 57 59 59 F62 65 63 63
Calling the club's payroll "the most important factor in determining" a
club's competitiveness, the MLB Panel reached the following conclusion
regarding MLB's competitive balance:
56. Id. at 32-34.
57. George F. Will, Oh, Swell: New York Wins Again, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 2000, at 104. The
San Francisco Giants (the 18th largest payroll) won one game and the Oakland A's (23rd) won two.
The Chicago White Sox (24th and the first Payroll Quartile 4 team to make the playoffs following the
strike) had the best record in the American League in 2000, but lost all three games it played in the
playoffs.
58. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 35 (Table 14).
59. Will, supra note 57, at 104.
60. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 31 (Table 10).
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While most fans do not demand or expect that their team will reach
postseason play each year, some have ample reason to believe that the
club they root for will remain chronically uncompetitive .... The
presence in the game of clubs, perhaps a majority, that are chronically
uncompetitive, alongside clubs that routinely dominate the postseason,
undermines the public's interest and confidence in the sport.61
B. Proffered Solutions
With both the MLB Panel and Costas framing baseball's problem as being
about a structural lack of competitive balance, one next needs to consider their
proposals as to how MLB should restructure its economics. At the heart of
both proposals lies some form of revenue sharing among the clubs and an
effort to rein in player salaries. The MLB Panel and Costas, however, take
some different approaches in achieving these goals and also offer distinct
ideas. With this is mind, let us examine their proposals for restructuring.
1. Baseball's Blue Ribbon Panel
MLB Commissioner Bud Selig appointed the MLB Panel, comprised of
Richard C. Levin, George J. Mitchell, Paul A. Volcker, and George F. Will,62
"to examine the question of whether Baseball's current economic system has
created a problem of competitive imbalance in the game."63 The MLB Panel
offered its report as recommendations to club owners and sought to have input
from interested groups, most notably the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA).64 Although essentially working on behalf of MLB
club owners, the MLB Panel brought with it a distinct set of values separate
from those of the owners. Specifically, the MLB Panel expressly considered
itself as "representing the interests of baseball fans." 65 For example, it noted
its concern that the increasing costs associated with teams trying to remain
competitive would "jeopardiz[e] MLB's traditional position as the affordable
61. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 36.
62. Levin is a Professor of Economics and President of Yale University. Mitchell is the former
Majority Leader in the United States Senate. Volcker served as Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System from 1979 to 1987. Will is a political commentator and author of two
well-respected books on baseball (Bunts: Curt Flood, Camden Yards, Pete Rose and Other
Reflections on Baseball (1998) and Men at Work: The Craft of Baseball (1990)). PANEL REPORT,
supra note 12, at 55-57.
63. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 53.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id. at 1. The first sentence of the Report starts: "The Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel on
Baseball Economics, representing the interests ofbaseballfans ..... (emphasis added). Id.
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family spectator sport." 66
As noted above, the MLB Panel's focus centered on the "competitive state
of the game," and its purpose was "to recommend solutions designated to
address any identifiable problem."67 The MLB Panel sought to offer reforms
that the club owners could implement unilaterally-that is, reforms not subject
to collective bargaining with the MLBPA, leaving such issues to be developed
in cooperation and collaboration with the players' union.68 In doing so, the
MLB Panel came up with six specific recommendations: revenue sharing, a
competitive balance tax, unequal distribution of MLB's Central Fund, a
competitive balance draft, reforms to its Rule 4 draft, and strategic franchise
relocations.
a. Revenue sharing
"MLB should share at least 40 percent, and perhaps as much as 50
percent, of all member clubs' local revenue, less local ballpark expenses as
uniformly defined."69
Currently, MLB clubs receive revenue from three primary sources:
o "local" revenues, which include ticket sales, local broadcasting
rights, ballpark concessions, parking, and team sponsorships;
o "Central Fund" revenues, which are industry-wide revenues, such
as from national television contracts and licensing agreements, and
which historically have been split evenly among clubs; and
o Limited revenue sharing implemented in 1996.
Of these, "local" revenues tend to provide the bulk of each club's revenue.
Between 1995 and 1999, local revenue provided on average seventy-five
percent of a club's revenue, ranging from forty-six percent of Montreal's
revenue coming from local revenue to the New York Yankees' ninety-five
percent.70 In dollar terms, the Yankees received more than ten times the local
revenue than the Expos.71 The variance among local revenues is in large part
attributable to the media market of the MLB clubs-the larger the market a
club is in, the more it can charge for its television and radio rights. Market
66. Id.
67. Id. at 53.
68. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 12.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 81-82 (Tables 27 and 28).
71. In 1999, the Yankees had local revenue of $176 million compared to the Expos' $12 million.
Id. at 17.
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size also affects other sources of local revenues, such as ballpark naming
rights, sponsorships, etc.72 Thus, the disparity of local revenues among clubs
is a structural problem associated in part to where a team is located; a club
cannot change its position without moving the franchise.73
The relative effect that the other sources of revenue has on any given club
depends, of course, on how much that club receives in local revenue. Thus,
consider the three highest and the three lowest local revenue teams in 1999:
Table 4: Comparative Impact of Revenue Sources, 199974
Club Local Revenues Central Funds Rev. Share Total
Highest Local Revenue Clubs
New York Yankees 175.94 13.32 (11.32) 177.94
New York Mets 132.32 13.32 (5.05) 140.59
Cleveland Indians 128.82 13.32 (5.36) 136.78
Lowest Local Revenue Clubs
Pittsburgh Pirates 32.67 13.32 17.20 63.19
Minnesota Twins 17.87 13.32 21.45 52.64
Montreal Expos 11.97 13.32 23.51 48.80
For the highest clubs, the Central Funds received represent less than ten
percent of their total revenues, but they do more than offset the funds that
these clubs give up under the current revenue sharing plan. On the other side
of the spectrum, however, the monies received through Central Funds and
revenue sharing are necessary components to sustain the economic viability of
the lowest local revenue clubs.
Given this, the MLB Panel proposed an enhanced revenue sharing scheme
that would shift a greater percentage of local revenues from the wealthier to
poorer teams. The Panel did not consider this proposal to be a form of
corporate welfare. Instead, the revenue sharing proposal would compensate
"visiting teams for their indispensable role in producing a marketable event."75
The MLB Panel considered the term "local revenue" somewhat of a misnomer
because the product that each team sells locally actually is a competition
between the home team and the visiting team. Without all the other teams in
the National and American Leagues, including poorer teams like the Expos
72. Id. at 19.
73. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 19 ("No matter how well-managed a club might be, it
cannot change its media market rank ... .
74. Id. (Appendices).
75. Id. at 38.
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and Twins, teams like the Mets and Yankees would not have a valuable
product. Therefore, the visiting teams should be entitled to share in the local
revenue riches that large market teams are able to generate.
Under the current revenue sharing scheme, each club contributes twenty
percent of its net local revenues to a shared pool, which is distributed in two
ways: (1) seventy-five percent is dispersed equally among all clubs, and (2)
the remaining twenty-five percent is distributed only to clubs who fall below
the local revenue average.76 The MLB Panel would enhance the revenue
sharing scheme in two ways. First, it would increase the percentage of net
local revenues that each club would contribute to at least forty percent and
possibly as high as fifty percent. Second, the Panel would redistribute the
pooled funds equally among all the clubs.77 Finally, the MLB Panel noted that
for its revenue sharing scheme to be effective, it must be coupled with a
minimum club payroll (discussed next) to "discourage clubs from using
revenue sharing to become profitable without making a proper effort to
become competitive on the field.... -71
b. Competitive balance tax
"MLB should levy a 50 percent competitive balance tax on clubs that are
above a fixed threshold of $84 million and all clubs should be encouraged to
have a minimum payroll of $40 million."79
As discussed above, the MLB Panel contended that the growing disparity
in teams' payrolls has disrupted MLB's competitive balance. Therefore, the
Panel sought to introduce a mechanism that would narrow the gap in the
aggregate salaries paid by Payroll Quartile 1 and Quartile 4 teams. The
proposed solution: taxing clubs that spend in excess of a fixed amount of
eighty-four million dollars80 and providing incentives for clubs to spend at
least forty million dollars8' on their payroll. The MLB Panel noted that this
76. Id.
77. Id. The MLB Panel contends that this "straight pool" plan is better than the current "split
pool" plan, which "creates anomalous results in the sense that some middle market clubs face a higher
marginal tax rate than the highest revenue clubs." Id.
78. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 38 (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 39. The MLB Panel chose the $84 million value based on a previous luxury tax
implemented in 1997 and designed to stem escalating salaries. Because the luxury tax was calculated
on a floating average salary based on the clubs with the fifth and sixth highest payrolls each year, the
threshold at which the tax would kick in continued to increase, and as a result, the penalty of being
above the threshold effectively decreased.
81. Id. The MLB Panel chose this amount to approach a "reasonable ratio" between Quartile I
and Quartile 4 teams' payroll.
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proposal would set into motion three dynamics. First, higher payroll teams
would face a tax disincentive and, as a result, limit their payroll. Second,
poorer teams would pursue the incentives (discussed below) to reach the forty
million dollar minimum threshold. Finally, middle level clubs could decide to
absorb higher salaries to become more competitive with richer clubs without
the fear of the wealthier clubs responding by outspending them.82
c. Central fund distributions
"MLB should use unequal distribution of new Central Fund revenues to
improve competitive balance, creating a 'Commissioner's Pool' that is
allocated to assist low-revenue clubs in improving their competitiveness and
in meeting the minimum payroll obligation of $40 million." 83
Although Central Funds traditionally have been distributed equally among
all clubs, in January 2000 MLB owners granted MLB's Commissioner the
power to distribute these funds unequally. Given this, the MLB Panel
suggested that the Commissioner have the discretion to distribute Central
Funds, including any new Central Funds,84 disproportionately to poorer teams
to offset partially their disadvantage in local revenue.85 The Commissioner
would be able to use his discretion in distributing these funds; for example, to
assist clubs in revenue-enhancing endeavors like building a new ball park or
developing young players. More importantly, the use of discretionary funds
would be the carrot to get poorer clubs to meet the proposed minimum forty
million dollar payroll. The MLB Panel proposed that any clubs below that
threshold would be barred from receiving any discretionary Central Funds.86
d. Competitive balance draft
"Major League Baseball should conduct an annual 'Competitive Balance
Draft' of players in which the weakest eight clubs would have a unique
opportunity to select non-40-man roster players from the organizations of the
eight clubs that qualified for the playoffs." 87
The MLB Panel developed this proposal to keep the wealthier clubs from
stockpiling young talent in their minor league farm systems. An important
82. Id.
83. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 9.
84. Although not discussed by the MLB Panel, one potential source of new Central Funds may
be revenues from the Internet. Schwarz, infra notes 164 and 165 and accompanying text.
85. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 40.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 9.
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part of this proposal is that the drafting club would not have to keep the
drafted player on its major league roster.88 Thus, a team could draft the best
prospect available with an eye toward him making the major leagues at some
point in the future.89
e. Rule 4 draft
"Major League Baseball should implement reforms in the Rule 4 draft."90
The current Rule 4 draft is MLB's amateur draft, in which clubs select
American high school and college players and obtain exclusive rights for that
player's services. 91 The MLB Panel's proposed reforms entailed: including
international players in the draft, 92 eliminating compensation picks for the loss
of a free agent,93 narrowing the number of times that a player may submit
himself for draft consideration, eliminating first round picks for clubs that
reach the playoffs, and allowing the trading of draft picks.94 These reforms
would tend to promote a more equal distribution of talented minor league
players among MLB clubs.
f Franchise relocations
"Major League Baseball should utilize strategic franchise relocations to
address the competitive issues facing the game."95
As noted above, one of the structural causes of revenue disparity among
clubs is the different size of their markets. The MLB Panel contended that
88. Id. at 40.
89. Under the current Rule 5 draft system, which the MLB Panel would keep in place as well, a
team may draft a minor league player not on another team's 40-man major league roster and must
either keep the drafted player on its major league roster or return the player to his original team.
90. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 9.
91. Id. at 41-42. The amateur players are not required to sign with the club that drafts them, but
they cannot play for any minor league team affiliated with a MLB team. For example, after J.D.
Drew chose not to accept the contract and signing bonus offered by the Philadelphia Phillies after the
club drafted him, he played the next season in an independent minor league. The next year, the St.
Louis Cardinals drafted him and were able to sign him. WEILER, supra note 11, at 200-05.
92. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 41. Currently, foreign-born players are excluded from the
draft, but can be signed as free agents by clubs.
93. Id. at 41. Teams get a compensation draft pick when they lose a highly ranked free agent.
The MLB Panel contended that this system favors teams that "rent" potential free agents-that is,
acquire them in the last year of their contract from a poorer team that knows that it cannot afford to
re-sign the player when he becomes a free agent. Because teams contending for playoff positions are
those more likely to "rent" players and those teams tend to be the wealthier clubs, the compensation
system has systematically benefited the wealthier clubs at the expense of poorer clubs. Id.
94. Id. at 41-42.
95. Id. at 10.
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"[c]lubs that have little likelihood of securing a new ballpark or undertaking
other revenue enhancing activities should have the option to relocate if better
markets can be identified. 96 The benefits that would stem from strategic
franchise relocation would include allowing the relocated club to compete
with richer clubs, giving MLB a stronger portfolio of markets, and enabling
the industry to generate more funds that would be distributed pursuant to the
proposed enhanced revenue sharing system.97
2. A fan's case for baseball
Bob Costas sought to offer a comprehensive approach to baseball's
problems because pursuing another piecemeal attempt, as baseball has done in
the past, would prove to be "disastrous." 98 Although he discussed a wide
range of issues ranging from baseball's economics to its wild card system, his
approach is that of the baseball fan. He wants to see "baseball become fun
again."99 For Costas, the special moments of the current game-such as the
1998 home run race between Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa-provide for
many fans the only enjoyment they may find in the game, because they know
"that [their] team had no living chance to contend for a pennant."' 100 He wants
the game to reward baseball fans that continue to return to and show their
support for the game. 10 1
Many of Costas' restructuring principles are similar to the MLB Panel's,
such as closing the salary gap between Payroll Quartile 1 and Quartile 4
teams. Costas, however, offers some different viewpoints on the best way to
accomplish these reforms as well as other ways to enhance baseball's appeal
to its fans. The crux of Costas' proposal boils down to revenue sharing: "And
to achieve competitive balance, especially in this era, you have to have
comprehensive revenue sharing... [because] the substantial existing revenue
isn't distributed equitably." 10 2
96. Id. at 43.
97. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 43.
98. CoSTAS, supra note 44, at 173.
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id.at5.
101. Id.at 11.
And it is for moments like [the home run race] that we keep returning to the game, why we still-despite
all the evidence-hold out hope for it. Because we know that, at its core, the game itself can still reward
us. That's why it's worth caring about That's why it's worth arguing about. And that's why I'm writing
this book.
Id.
102. Id. at 54.
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Like the MLB Panel, Costas notes the interdependence of MLB
franchises. 1 3 As a joint effort among all the clubs in a league, MLB teams
need "to cooperate in some measure to generate revenues."' 1 4 Moreover, a
sports league can bring together the common interests of owners, players, and
fans alike: "A sports league is a business whose success and appeal to the
public depend on both the quality of play and the perceived fairness of
competition."' 1 5 Viewing MLB in this manner, "franchises still have an
incentive both to make profits and to win championships, as well as an
obligation to the welfare of the league as a whole"--an obligation that also
extends to players who reap the financial benefits of playing in the league. 10 6
In the end, "the ideal is at once practical and profitable. Teams make money.
Players get rich. And fans get something that, in a real sense, money can't
buy."107
Turning to Costas' specific proposals, he suggests a revenue sharing
scheme in which each club would contribute one-half of its local broadcasting
revenue to a national pool to divide equally among each club. In addition,
clubs would contribute a portion of their ticket revenue to the national pool-
instead of a fifty-fifty split like that proposed by the MLB Panel, teams would
keep seventy percent of their ticket revenue with the remaining thirty percent
contributed to the pool. Costas contends that such a revenue sharing plan
would not only narrow the structural differences between richer and poorer
clubs, but also establish a sound economic model that would enable club
owners to negotiate with the MLBPA.
Like the MLB Panel, Costas offers a plan that would narrow the gap in
club salaries to a 2:1 ratio between the richest and poorest clubs, and he offers
a range of forty million dollars to eighty million dollars as a starting point.
But his proposal differs in several key ways:
o Whereas under the MLB Panel teams were provided with
incentives to encourage them to fall within the proposed salary range,
Costas would impose a mandatory salary floor-and-cap system; 108
o Unlike the MLB Panel's proposal of establishing amounts for the
103. Id. at 42-43 ("But properly understood, Major League Baseball is less like 30 different
restaurants and much more like 30franchises within a single restaurant chain.").
104. Id. at 43 (citing Notre Dame Economist Richard Sheehan).
105. Id. at 49.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 91-104; see also supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (noting that the MLB
Panel would tax teams with salaries above $84 million and provide incentives for teams below $40
million).
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high and low ends of the salary range that would not change, Costas
would calculate the salary floor based on the per-team average of local
and national media revenues and set the high value at two times that
amount; thus, as media revenues increased, the salary range would
increase; 10 9 and
0 Although the MLB Panel suggested that the salary ranges could be
implemented without affecting the MLBPA's collective bargaining
rights, Costas would implement this salary range by negotiating with
the players and providing them consideration to do so.110
For Costas, these two reforms-revenue sharing and salary adjustments-
would take MLB a long way to restoring the primacy of the game itself and
allowing the business of baseball to recede to the background and become a
more stable, lucrative endeavor. 111
C. The Shortcomings: Confusing the Means and the Ends
Approaches like the MLB Panel's or Costas' are useful tools in beginning
to address baseball's problems. 112 In addition, the reforms they suggest-
revenue sharing and narrowing the payroll gap in particular-will likely be the
cornerstone of any restructuring that MLB undertakes in the near future. But
their recommendations, as structured, do not offer sufficient incentives for
clubs-rich or poor-to pursue them simply in the name of achieving the
desired end of enhancing baseball's competitive balance.
As discussed above, both the MLB Panel and Costas frame MLB's
problems in terms of competitiveness, which is the dependent variable in their
equation. An enhanced competitive balance, however, is an inappropriate end
109. Id. at 92-93.
110. Id. at 95-102. Specifically, Costas would require a "superstar salary cap" equal to one-
fourth the minimum team salary and a fixed range of graduated salaries for players in their first four
years of service, but increase the minimum salary from $200,000.00 to $300,000.00 and allow players
to pursue free agency two years earlier. Id. Costas also notes that under his plan, the aggregate
amount paid to all players would increase by approximately $150 million per season. Id. at 99.
111. Id. at 103-04. Costas' suggestions to enhance MLB's fan appeal extend beyond these
economic matters. He also offers many other suggestions that may or may not have an effect on
economic matters: undertaking a "radically simple realignment," eliminating the wild card playoff
team, eliminating the designated hitter, adjusting the rules regarding the roster for All-Star games,
opening the amateur draft to foreign players, holding umpires more accountable for proper officiating,
permitting a limited use of instant replay, continuing efforts to promote minorities in baseball,
limiting the use of commercial advertising in the ballpark, and bringing back daytime World Series
games. Id. at 115-72.
112. As Costas notes, "I don't presume to have all the right answers. But I hope in many cases
I'm on the right track. And at the very least, these things are worth discussing." Id. at 14.
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for a MLB club to pursue. Despite the interdependent nature of MLB as a
sports league, each club is a distinct business entity. The form of each club's
ownership structure may differ, ranging from being wholly owned subsidiaries
of large corporate conglomerates" l3 to corporations with a dominant
recognizable majority owner 114 to partnerships.' 1 5  Regardless of the
ownership structure, each club as a business entity must have as its primary
end the objective of making profits for its shareholders or partners. As stated
in the seminal case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.:116
A business corporation organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors... does not extend
to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the
nondistribution of profits among shareholders in order to devote them
to other purposes. 117
Given this, establishing MLB's competitive balance as an end of any
economic restructuring would be inconsistent with this fundamental premise
of business law. In this sense, each team must take an individualistic, narrow
view of its own self-interest; it cannot set another team's competitiveness
ahead of its own duty to make a profit for its investors. Furthermore, a club
may even have difficulty justifying putting its own competitiveness ahead of
its profitability.
Certainly real-world examples of this abound, such as the case of the
Florida Marlins following the 1997 World Series. Consider also the San
Diego Padres, who made the World Series in 1998, but allowed several key
players to leave via free agency in a cost-cutting move before the 1999 season.
In 2000, the Padres were required to make a twenty million dollar cash call on
owners to cover what were deemed "intolerable losses" and planned to reduce
spending on salaries further before the 2001 season to prevent any future cash
calls. 118  For these clubs, on-the-field success meant financial losses.
Consequently, the only way to keep from losing money was to be willing to
lose games.
113. For example, the Tribune Company owns the Chicago Cubs and Walt Disney owns the
Anaheim Angles.
114. For example, George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees and Tom Hicks of the Texas
Rangers.
115. The Minnesota Twins, for example, are owned in partnership form.
116. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
117. Id. at 684.
118. Cash Flow Problems, ARLINGTON STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 17, 2000, at 7C (quoting club
President Larry Lucchino).
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In addition to competitiveness, the MLB Panel and Costas sought to
promote another value, another set of interests-those of the fans. But like
competitiveness, restructuring baseball's economics to promote the fans'
interests is an inappropriate end for the clubs as business entities to pursue.
Moreover, MLB's antitrust exemption effectively allows clubs to ignore as a
matter of law the fans' or general public's interests when it comes to
conducting their business affairs. Under the Flood Act and case law, fans,
even as consumers of baseball, do not have standing to sue MLB clubs for any
alleged antitrust violations. 119 When the business of baseball is at issue, as it
will be in any proposed economic restructuring, the baseball fans' legal
interests are, at best, of indirect concern. 120
Given all this, as a matter of business law, the end objective of any
economic restructuring in MLB must be profit. Each club individually must
approve of any proposed restructuring on the basis of the reforms' likely
effects on that club's profitability. Admittedly, a state's constituency
statute121 may afford a club some flexibility in determining its best interests,
such that the clubs could take into account such factors as the league's
competitive balance, the fan's interests, or some conception of the "best
interests of the game." However, the bottom line is clear-each club must
make a business judgment as to how best improve its own profitability. 122
119. 15 U.S.C. § 27a (granting standing to sue only to major league players); McCoy v. Major
League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (suit arising following the 1994 players'
strike).
120. McCoy, 911 F. Supp. at 458 (stating that the "injury suffered by the fans is not direct, that
is, the injury can be fairly characterized as an indirect 'ripple effect"').
121. See, e.g., OHfo REV. CODEANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 2001).
[A] director, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, shall
consider the interests of the corporation's shareholders and, in his discretion, may consider any of the
following:
(1) The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, and consumers;
(2) The economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal considerations;
(4) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders ....
Id.
See also LEWIs D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 122 (4th ed. 1998)
(characterizing these provisions as "typical" in a constituency statute).
122. Consider, for example, the ten-year, $252 million contract that the Texas Rangers gave Alex
Rodriguez in December 2000--the richest in sports history. Rodriguez will earn $21 million per
season for the first seven seasons, and provided he does not exercise an option to terminate that
contract after year seven, his salary escalates thereafter. Despite the enormity of the contract, the
Rangers expected to make a profit in 2001. T.R. Sullivan, A-Rod 'Fell in Love' With Team, Owner,
ARLINGTON STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 13, 2000, at ID.
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Both the MLB Panel and Costas treat a club's profitability as a secondary
concem. 123 Costas acknowledges that a number of teams would sacrifice in
the short term so that baseball as a whole might be better off.1 2 4 He
specifically points out that under his plan the "Yankees profits would be
sliced... [but] the Yankees and teams like them will still be profitable."' 125
Given this, these proposals do not necessarily give richer teams an incentive to
agree to an enhanced revenue sharing. They would be required to give up
substantial gross revenue without regard to their net profitability.
Even poorer clubs may find that these revenue sharing proposals do not
serve their business needs. Although they would receive more revenue, a
number of MLB clubs would likely need to increase their expenditures just to
meet the minimum payroll. For example, using 1999 data, the eleven clubs
that fell below a forty million dollar payroll would receive an average net gain
of about three million dollars from a fifty percent local revenue sharing
scheme after incurring additional payroll expenses-they range from a net loss
of nearly nine million dollars (Florida) to a gain of over fifteen million dollars
(Cincinnati). 126 But these clubs tend to operate already with a net operating
loss. Thus, for the clubs that would suffer an additional net loss, the revenue
sharing/minimum payroll scheme is far from being in their financial interests.
The scheme would impose yet another structural barrier affecting their
profitability and, indirectly, their competitiveness. As for the other clubs, the
enhanced revenue sharing has little or no effect on their profitability. As with
the rich clubs, the proposed reforms provide little economic incentive to
pursue them.
Costas notes: "Forced to choose between winning a championship and
breaking even, or not winning a title but turning a profit, almost any owner-
Asked whether it's now hypocritical to sign a player to a $252 million contract, [Rangers owner Tom]
Hicks said: "What I have difficulty with is a team taking their payroll up to 85 percent of their total
revenues and end up losing a lot of money. That's stupid.... We're running this like a business. We're
going to make a profit next year." Hicks projects the Rangers will have $160 million in revenue next
year and a payroll around $80 million.
Id. (emphasis added).
123. The MLB Panel, for example, quantifies some problems associated with club profitability,
club debt, and franchise values in an appendix, but expressly notes that its "recommendations are not
based on [its] analysis of these topics." PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 36.
124. COSTAS, supra note 44, at 69.
125. Id.
126. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 81-83. The net gain/(loss) for these eleven clubs would
be: Minnesota: $3.48 million; Florida: ($9.00 million); Kansas City: ($3.03 million); Montreal: $8.78
million; Pittsburgh: $4.82 million; Chicago White Sox: ($7.16 million); Oakland: $4.33 million;
Philadelphia: $2.96 million; Detroit: $7.81 million; Tampa Bay: $2.81 million; Cincinnati: $15.54
million. Id.
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save for the most craven and soulless-would choose the former over the
latter. In a heartbeat." 12 7  But this scenario omits an important economic
issue: MLB clubs tend to lose money. Between 1995 and 1999, the average
annual loss across all MLB teams was nearly seven million dollars. 128
Although the New York Yankees ($64.50 million total profit between 1995
and 1999), Cleveland Indians ($45.92 million), and Colorado Rockies ($12.44
million) made money, each of the other clubs were in the red over the same
period, with the San Francisco Giants ($97.02 million in total loss), Toronto
Blue Jays ($87.63 million), and Anaheim Angels ($83.32 million) suffering
the largest losses. The teams that tend to incur the largest losses are those in
the middle of the pack in terms of total revenue. 129
Before a club can even make the decision that Costas sets out, it first
needs to be in a position to break even. The proposed reforms do little to get
teams there, in part, because of their misplaced emphasis on competitive
balance as the goal of restructuring. Unless a reform proposal improves a
club's ability to earn a profit, then it stands little chance of being accepted by
the owners. Admittedly, this is a very difficult task given the wide vast array
of ownership and economic structures currently in place. But this must be a
fundamental proposition of any restructuring proposal.
To summarize the above discussion, such matters as MLB's competitive
balance and the interest of the fans are improper ends for any proposed
restructuring, because the clubs' profitability is the only legitimate end. This
does not mean, however, that competition and the fans should be forsaken or
ignored. On the contrary, both ends should be pursued, but only in a proper
way. They represent important values that can serve as the means to a
successful restructuring, just not the ends themselves.
One should view appealing to the fans and enhancing a team's
competitiveness as ways to improve profitability, which thus effectively
reverses the direction of the relationship that underlies the MLB Panel's and
Costas' proposals: baseball's economics is now the dependent variable of the
equation. 130
127. COSTAS, supra note 44, at 47. Costas continues, "[b]aseball fans know the Detroit Tigers
won the World Series in 1984. But which was the most profitable team in baseball that year? No fan
knows, and even better, no fan cares." Id.
128. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 84 (Table 30).
129. Id. at 80-86. Between 1995 and 1999, the average annual gain/(loss) for a club in each
revenue quartile was: Revenue Quartile 1 = $1.8 million; Revenue Quartile 2 = ($11.0 million);
Revenue Quartile 3 = ($13.2 million); and Revenue Quartile 4 = ($7.8 million). Id.
130. This relationship should also depict the indirect effect that competitiveness has on
profitability by enhancing fan appeal. See infra note 132. For now, this relationship has been omitted
from the graphic.
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Competitive Balance
Baseball's economics
Fan Appeal
The relationship between appealing to fans and profitability is direct. The
more fans that come to a team's games, the more money that team makes. 131
Similarly, a team's on-the-field successes often lead to enhanced
profitability. 132 These are simple, but important, propositions to keep in mind.
A MLB team can seek to make a profit in any number of ways. It could
choose to emphasize its entertainment value-perhaps comparable to going to
a movie or a concert-even if the team is not competitive. 133 It could choose
to play most of its games during the day even though the norm is to play at
night.134 Or it could choose to invest in high quality players to create a
competitive team. These are matters of business judgment and are well within
the ambit of the authority of a team's business decision-makers.
The distinction between competitiveness as a means and as an end is a fine
one; the relationship between competitive balance and economics is blurry
indeed. In fact, viewing the two concepts in simple terms like "independent
value" and "dependent value" is incorrect. Rather than a one-directional
relationship, however defined, the two are interrelated in a dynamic
131. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., SEC Form S-1, at *6 (Apr. 3, 1998), SEC EDGAR,
Archives.
These strong attendance figures provide the Club with a predictable ticket sale and premium seating
revenue base... [that] has allowed [the Club] to create a competitive, profitable team within the
framework of a [MLB] system that is confronted with escalating player salaries and limited means for
clubs to increase revenue.
Id. at *7.
132. Id. at*11.
The team's recent successes have generated fan enthusiasm, resulting in [greater local revenues].
Furthermore, success in the regular season has permitted participation in post-season playoffs, which has
provided the Company with additional revenue and income. Poor on-field performance by the Indians is
likely to adversely affect revenue and income.
Id.
133. CosTAs, supra note 44, at 57-58.
As Sandy Alderson said before he left the A's to join Major League Baseball's central office, small-
market teams are no longer in the business of competitive baseball, they're in the business of
entertainment .... [T]hey have to get fans to the ballpark by some means other than the pursuit of a
championship.
Id.
134. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780-781 (I1l. App. Ct. 1968) (upholding the decision
of Philip Wrigley, the majority stockholder and controlling director of the Chicago Cubs, not to install
lights at Wrigley Field in a shareholder derivative action).
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relationship. The cause of one creates an effect in the other and vice versa.
To improve MLB's overall economic situation, it can seek to enhance the
competitive balance, but to do so requires a restructuring of baseball's
economics. The key thing to keep in mind, though, is that the final analysis
has to be economic, because the last calculation has to be profitability. The
MLB Panel and Costas overlooked this crucial step, but that does not mean
that their proposals would fail automatically. Instead, they can be the
springboard toward a proper solution.
III. HITTING THIRD: WORKING TOWARD A NEW SOLUTION
A. Reassessing the Problem and Redefining the Solution
On November 21, 2000, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig testified before
the United States Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Business Rights, and Competition. In his testimony, Selig stated: "The
economic landscape of the game must be changed, and the way we do
business must be changed.' 135 But as discussed in the previous section,
current restructuring proposals do not offer a significant enough change to
MLB's economic system-in the words of Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH),
"the problem seems to be racing far ahead of the solution thus far."136 Thus,
the question becomes how can the business of baseball be changed to achieve
the many disparate goals at stake-increasing the profitability of all clubs,
improving the game's competitive balance, managing player compensation,
and strengthening the sport's fan base.
At this point, let us take a step back and assess where baseball currently
stands:
• MLB is (for the most part) a government-sanctioned monopoly;
• MLB clubs are saddled with long-term contracts that force them to
pay escalating rates for more than they really can afford;
* Teams are burdened by debt and other fixed costs;
• The quality of MLB's product is deteriorating;
• Customers are asked to bear the increasing costs of MLB's product
and, as a result, are exploring other alternatives; and
• MLB needs a fundamental restructuring of its business model to
135. Ronald Blum, Selig: "Time For Sweeping Changes" in Major League Baseball,
CHATrANOOGA TIMEs, Nov. 22,2000, at D2.
136. Id.
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address all of these problems comprehensively.
In broad terms, these problems characterize the state of the MLB today.
They also characterize the state of the electric utility industry for
approximately the past ten years. To address these problems, much of the
energy industry has started to deregulate, and in doing so, has undergone a
fundamental restructuring designed to lower customer prices and increase
company profitability, all while maintaining the quality of its product (i.e.,
reliability of service). 137 MLB shares similar goals and, as a result, may be
able to take some lessons from the restructuring of the energy industry to
develop a framework for undertaking the "sweeping changes" that
Commissioner Selig said are needed. 138
Admittedly, the energy industry restructuring does not provide a direct
comparison for MLB-they are two distinct industries. But some of the
economic theories underlying electrical deregulation-particularly, the
blending of competitive forces and a regulated natural monopoly to achieve
the goals stated above 139-and financial mechanisms used to facilitate change
can be applied to MLB to develop a plan that not only benefits club owners,
players, and fans alike, but also has the potential to be approved by each of the
constituent interests.
B. Lessons From the Restructuring of the Energy Industry
Approximately one-half of the states across the U.S. have either
deregulated or taken steps toward deregulating their energy industry. To
simplify the analysis here, however, we shall focus on one utility in
particular-Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. Niagara provides a useful
model for MLB for two reasons. First, it had to deal with many of the generic
issues related to the fundamental economic restructuring associated with
deregulating the industry. Second, Niagara was burdened by contracts with
independent power producers (IPPs), which required Niagara to pay above-
market rates. How Niagara dealt with these contracts offers an approach of
how MLB can address the issue of players' salaries.
137. The transition to a deregulated energy industry has not gone as smoothly as proponents had
originally hoped. For example, energy customers in California have been subject to price spikes and
blackouts. These problems, however, are more attributable to the specifics associated with energy-
such as the inability to store electricity and the lack of sufficient generating capacity-than to the
economic theory underlying deregulation, which is the focus of discussion in this article.
138. Blum, supra note 135.
139. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 387 (3d ed. 2000)
("If changing technologies can make it possible for competition to work at least in certain sectors of
the industry, that approach is likely to be preferred to regulation.").
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Before we begin to apply the lessons that Niagara's restructuring offers
MLB, some background information is useful. Niagara was a traditional,
vertically integrated utilityl 40 that provided electricity to a good portion of
upstate New York from Albany to Buffalo. By 1991, "the Company's
competitive position and financial performance [had] deteriorated and the
price of electricity paid per [kilowatt-hour] by its customers [had] risen
significantly above the national average." 141  Although Niagara's internal
expenses were somewhat excessive, the primary cause of its economic
problems stemmed from over 150 power purchase agreements (PPAs) with
IPPs.
Federal law, in particular the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act
(PURPA),142 requires utilities to enter into PPAs with certain IPPs1 43 at the
utility's avoided cost-that is, a utility's "cost of either generating the
electricity itself or purchasing it from another source. ' ' 144 New York enacted a
statute that further required utilities to pay IPPs a minimum of six-cents-per-
kilowatt-hour ($0.06/kWh). 145 As a result of the statute, upstate New York's
then-existing infrastructure, and the potential for developing new energy
projects, a large number of IPPs built qualifying facilities in Niagara's service
territory. 146 As time moved on, wholesale energy prices never reached the 6
0/kWh that Niagara paid at a minimum to the IPPs, and Niagara's supply of
electricity exceeded consumers demand, which led to Niagara's financial
plight. Moreover, the amount Niagara spent on IPP power increased more
than five-fold, from $200 million in 1990 to approximately $1.1 billion in
140. Niagara Mohawk was a vertically integrated utility in the sense that it performed all aspects
of delivering electricity to end users. It owned facilities that generated electricity, transmitted and
distributed that electricity over its own power lines, and provided customer service to the rate payers.
"Traditionally, most of the large privately owned electric utilities in the United States have been
vertically integrated--owning power plants, substations, transmission lines, and distribution
systems." Viscusi, supra note 139, at 388-89.
141. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., SEC Form S-3, at *8 (Apr. 7, 1998), SEC EDGAR,
Archives.
142. The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (2000)).
143. For IPPs to take advantage of this requirement, they must be "Qualifying Facilities" under
PURPA. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. III 1997).
144. Ecogen Four Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 914 F. Supp. 57,59 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), vacatedsub nom. Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163 F.3d 153
(2d Cir. 1998).
145. N.Y. PUB SERV. § 66-c(2) (Consol. Supp. 2001). The state legislature revoked the six-cent
law, as it was known, in 1992, but grandfathered all existing contracts that had been entered into
based on the law.
146. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra note 141, at *8.
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1997.147 In 1995, Niagara announced that if it were not able to reduce these
costs, it faced the prospect of bankruptcy.148
At the same time that Niagara was trying to address its growing financial
problem, other New York utilities were facing similar problems although not
quite to Niagara's extent. As a result, the New York State Public Service
Commission (PSC)-the government agency that oversees and regulates New
York utilities-started to explore energy deregulation as a means to reduce
electric rates, which were well above the national average. The PSC's
proceeding, called Competitive Opportunities, culminated in a 1996 order that
established the "framework of goals and strategies for restructuring the electric
industry in the state." 149 In promulgating this Order, the PSC established a
new economic framework for the energy industry in New York.
The primary emphasis of the PSC's Competitive Opportunities Order was
to establish a competitive retail market and to allow consumers to choose
which company would sell them their electricity. The theory behind this was
that by opening up the generation component of the industry to competition,
power producers would produce electricity more efficiently, and thus sell at a
cheaper rate. Competitive forces, therefore, would require individual
producers to manage their variable costs to maximize their profit.
On the other hand, certain functions of the industry, namely the
transmission and distribution (T&D) of electricity, are natural monopolies. 150
These functions provide a common benefit to all users, but only one company
in any given service area realistically can perform them. Thus, the PSC
recognized that energy "deregulation" would require the continued regulation
of a singular central entity-the T&D utility. The PSC also recognized that
certain costs associated with providing a safe, reliable, and environmentally
147. Id.
148. Agis Salpukas, New York State Utility Seeks Sweeping Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1995,
at A35 ("Threatening to throw itself into bankruptcy unless it wins relief, the power utility that serves
much of upstate New York... proposed yesterday to form a separate company to free itself from
state regulation over the generation of power.").
149. Phillip S. Cross, N.Y Issues Electric Restructuring Plan, 134 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 45 (1996).
These goals included: establishing a competitive retail energy market, utilities divesting their
generation assets, establishing a "systems benefit charge" to pay for public policy programs, and
providing the utilities the reasonable opportunity to recover stranded costs, which are above-market
costs incurred in the regulated environment and which cannot be supported in a competitive one. Id.
150. Viscusi, supra note 139, at 390 ("The transmission function (high voltages) and the
distribution function (low voltages) remain natural monopolies and will continue to require
regulation."). "An industry is a natural monopoly if the production of particular good or service by a
single firm minimizes cost." Id. at 337. The T&D functions present high costs and great barriers to
entry, including the expense of constructing a wide-ranging transmission system, the limited land
available for such a system, and the inability for consumers to change companies who distribute
energy into their homes or businesses.
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sound energy system entailed a large number of fixed costs that, like T&D
services, provided a common benefit. In addition, to achieve a competitive
energy industry, certain stranded costs associated with the transition would
need to be absorbed and paid for.151 Because the costs associated with public
policy concerns and the transition to a competitive market ultimately provided
a common benefit, the PSC generally shifted responsibility for these costs to
the central T&D monopoly and allowed it to recover such costs through wire
charges on T&D services. 152
The PSC allowed each of the state's utilities to develop individual-based
restructurings that adhered to the principles it set forth in the Competitive
Opportunities proceeding. Before Niagara Mohawk could proceed with
implementing the Order, it needed to address its problem with the IPP
contracts. To that end, Niagara negotiated a Master Restructuring Agreement
(MRA) with fourteen IPPs with twenty-seven PPAs, which represented
approximately seventy-five percent of Niagara's above-market IPP and PPA
obligations. 153 Under the MIRA, Niagara bought out the above-market portion
of those existing PPAs for a total of $3.6 billion. Some IPPs had their
contracts terminated solely in exchange for cash, while others received shorter,
more market-based fixed price contracts in addition to cash.154 Furthermore,
in an effort to provide more value to the IPPs, and to tie Niagara's and the
IPPs' interests together, Niagara granted the IPPs approximately twenty-three
percent of the outstanding shares of the company's common stock.155 Niagara
151. Id. at390.
[Joskow] also noted that there is a "price gap" of perhaps 3-4 cents in California and the Northeast
between the price of generation service included in regulated retail rates and the lower current and
projected wholesale market prices. If generation services were suddenly to be priced at market prices in
those areas, the present value of losses to utilities would be on the order of $100 billion. This is the
"stranded cost" problem.
Id. (citing Paul Joskow of IT).
152. Cross, supra note 149, at 48.
153. Niagara Mohawk Holdings, Inc., Amend. No. 1 to SEC Form S-4, at *9 (May 19, 1998),
SEC EDGAR, Archives. The MRA negotiations started with 19 IPPs representing 44 PPAs. A total
of 16 IPPs with 29 PPAs eventually signed the MRA, but two IPPs withdrew from the transaction
before it was consummated. Id. The three IPPs that did not sign the M1RA owned hydroelectric
power plants; these projects had different economic structures than the other IPP participants in the
MRA. The hydro IPPs were removed from the negotiations approximately one month before the
remaining parties signed the MRA. This article's author served as Vice President of Asset
Management for one of the hydro IPPs during this process and participated in the negotiations
culminating in the MRA.
154. Id. at *42 ("Under the MRA, 18 PPAs... will be terminated completely and 8 PPAs...
will be restated on economic terms and conditions that the Company believes are more favorable to it
than the existing PPAs.").
155. Id.
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characterized the economic benefit that the MRA provided as:
The primary objective of the MRA is to convert a large and growing
off-balance sheet payment obligation that threatens the financial
viability of the Company into a fixed and manageable capital
obligation. Accordingly, the Company believes that the lower
contractual obligations resulting from the MRA will significantly
improve cash flow .... 156
The MRA facilitated Niagara's movement to a deregulated environment.
In one fell swoop, it terminated escalating above-market contracts that had
already been signed; converted those obligations into more defined and
manageable costs; and, perhaps most importantly, established a framework
that resulted in lower costs going forward.
C. Applying These Lessons to MLB
From this review of Niagara's restructuring, one can begin to develop a
model that MLB can use to restructure its own financial system. The core
principle of this model is that MLB should blend aspects of a regulated
monopoly with competition. MLB has a great asset at its disposal, namely its
government-sanctioned protection from federal antitrust laws. It needs to use
this asset more effectively. For years, MLB has used its antitrust exemption
primarily to perpetuate the reserve clause system. With the advent of free
agency and the demise of the reserve clause system, MLB has not used its
exemption proactively-it primarily has been invoked to escape civil liability
arising from lawsuits. 157
Restructuring baseball's economics provides MLB the opportunity to use
its exemption to its benefit. Recall that the Flood Act expressly exempts many
aspects of the business of baseball from federal antitrust laws.158 MLB should
centralize many of the expenditures related to these categories into a central
entity akin to the T&D company in the energy context. To some extent, MLB
has already started to do this. For example, MLB consolidated the separate
league offices for the American and National Leagues into the
Commissioner's office, and also consolidated MLB's oversight of umpires
into one office. MLB now needs to go further and consolidate expenses in
other areas as well, such as player development, travel between games, renting
spring training facilities, stadium management, advertising and promotion,
156. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra note 141, at *9-10.
157. See, e.g., McCoy, 911 F. Supp. 454.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 27a(b).
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debt repayment, and the purchasing of merchandise inventory.159 These are
expenses that each of the thirty MLB clubs currently undertake individually.
By consolidating these expenses and negotiating new contracts aggressively,
MLB would likely achieve some economies of scale and reduce the aggregate
outlay for these expenses. 16
0
To give an idea of the extent of possible savings, consider this: in 1999,
the difference between the aggregate total revenue for all clubs and aggregate
payroll expenses was approximately $1.3 billion. 161 For discussion purposes,
let us assume that this represents the approximate total expenses that could be
centralized. If, by consolidating these expenses, MLB could reduce the
aggregate expenditures, for example, by 10% to 20%, that would result in a
total savings of $130 to $260 million savings per season, or $4.3 to $8.6
million per club. Admittedly, this is not an extraordinary amount given
MLB's current situation, but it is a sufficient level of savings to contribute to
an overall solution to enhance each club's profitability.
Two aspects of the consolidation of expenses require further discussion.
The first relates to player development costs. Player development provides
both individualized benefits for each club as well as a common benefit.
Historically, the focus has been on the former with clubs relying on their own
scouts to find players to draft, and relying on minor league coaches to hone the
players' skills. Given this, clubs may be reluctant to cede control over this
aspect of their business to a centralized entity.
But in the modem game and business, the common benefit provided by
player development has become more prevalent. Players are more mobile via
free agency, younger players are often coveted in trades, and expansion has
resulted in players being rushed to the major leagues much faster. Because of
this fluidity of player movement, all clubs benefit when other teams have
quality scouting and player development resources. The players developed by
a club are more than likely to move to another club at some point in their
career. As with other aspects of the business of baseball, however, financially
troubled teams often will make cuts in scouting and player development
159. These expense categories were taken from line items of the Cleveland Indians financial
statement for the nine months ending September 30, 1999. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., SEC
Form 10-Q, at *5-*7 (Nov. 15, 1999), SEC EDGAR, Archives. These line items are offered as being
representative of expenses that MLB teams currently undertake.
160. For example, if MLB were to put out to bid a contract to handle the food and beverage
concessions for all thirty MLB clubs (or some sizeable subset), it likely could extract very favorable
terms from the bidders. Although in most other contexts such behavior might be deemed as anti-
competitive, MLB's antitrust exemption seemingly would enable MLB to pursue such a course.
161. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 77 (Table 25).
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resources when profits are lacking. 162  Therefore, to enhance player
development resources league-wide, this aspect of the business should be
consolidated.
The second aspect of consolidation that requires special attention concerns
the debt that each club carries on its balance sheet. The level of a team's debt
does not directly show up on its income statement calculating profit and loss,
but it eventually places a great drain on the club's financial position. Between
1993 and 1999, total industry debt increased 243% from $604 million to
$2.075 billion.163 As the MLB Panel noted "[t]he average club debt in 1999
was approximately $69 million, and undoubtedly will continue to rise." 164
Consolidating some or most of this debt within a central entity will allow
MLB to repay this debt in a more cost-effective manner. First, by
consolidating the debt of thirty different teams into one debt, MLB will be
able to manage the cash flow necessary to amortize the principle. Second, if
the debt were cross-collateralized among all of MLB's assets, including those
of individual teams, MLB should be able to obtain a lower cost of
indebtedness than the current average, thereby generating additional savings
over the current economic system.
One should note that MLB has provided a centralized credit facility
through which clubs can obtain access to revolving credits. But each club
remained individually responsible for repaying any advances it took under the
credit facility, because the obligation was secured by each club's rights to
receive Central Funds.165 Consolidating the repayment of existing debt as
discussed here is an extension of this credit facility framework. Moreover,
doing so would relieve a significant burden that weighs clubs down, and its
effect has not fully been realized yet. Addressing MLB's increasing debt level
as part of a comprehensive economic restructuring is a way to preempt a
significant problem waiting to erupt down the road.
The obvious correlation to loading a significant level of expenses on a
centralized entity is that the entity must have some form of revenue. It is in
162. For example, in November 2000, the Arizona Diamondbacks announced they were seeking
to cut operation costs by $10 million through an across-the-board reduction in administrative
expenses. In regard to Arizona's cuts in scouting and player development expenses, team president
Rich Dozer said, "It's a little bit of everything. It's not just a baseball operation thing or just a
baseball marketing thing. Every department has cut its operating budget, some of them by two
percent and some by 10 or 15 percent." Financial Losses Spur Cutbacks by D-Backs, Hous. CHRON.,
Nov. 15, 2000, at 5.
163. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 50.
164. Id.
165. The credit facility expired as of December 31, 2000. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., supra
note 131, at *35.
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this context that the sharing of local revenue comes into play as clubs will be
required to contribute to the central entity. In this regard, the formulaic
approaches proffered by the MLB Panel and Bob Costas provide a useful
framework, although the percentages may need to be greater than originally
proposed in order for the central entity to meet its expenses. Keep in mind,
however, that the proposed system provides a benefit to all clubs by not only
shifting revenue from these clubs, but also by shifting expenses and leveraging
the revenue more efficiently. Thus, when revenue sharing is used in this
manner, it is consistent with the fundamental tenets of business law that
require increasing profits.
In addition to the revenue-sharing scheme, MLB should continue to
pursue additional forms of revenue to cover the expenses incurred by the
central entity. MLB club owners already have done this to a degree by
agreeing to consolidate all revenue derived from Internet ventures and then
distributing the money among all clubs. 166 MLB estimated that it would
receive approximately fifty million dollars in Internet revenue in 2000 and
believes that the revenue will increase to over one billion dollars by 2005.167
To the extent that the central entity realizes a profit each year, under the plan
proposed here, those funds would be available for distribution.
With MILB's newly formed central entity responsible for many of the
expenses that provide a common benefit to all clubs, that leaves open the
question of which expenses the club is responsible for. Once again, the
deregulation of the energy industry provides guidance for MLB. Much like
individual power producers have become responsible for managing their
variable costs to maximize a profit in a competitive marketplace, each MLB
club will be required to do the same. Because of the differences in local
revenue, each team will have a different level of funds available for player
salaries. Therefore, each club will need to put together the best team possible
within its salary constraints. As will be discussed in the next section, the
proposed restructuring reduces players' base salaries, thus enabling clubs to
put together a more competitive team at lower fixed prices.
D. Restructuring Player Compensation
Although the focus of this article thus far has been on club profitability,
MLB clubs cannot become more profitable without addressing players'
salaries. In this regard, player contracts are similar to the IPPs and PPAs that
led Niagara Mohawk to pursue the MIRA. Similarly, the economic concepts
166. Alan Schwarz, Big Leagues'Net Bet, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 2000, at 74C.
167. Id. at 74D.
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employed in the MRA can be applied to the context of restructuring player
compensation.
Before doing so, let us consider once again the proposals offered by the
MLB Panel and Bob Costas to reduce player salaries. Generally speaking,
both, in effect, envision a salary structure where clubs will pay between forty
to eighty million dollars in player salaries. Although these proposed structures
themselves are useful to consider, players would likely reject the specifics of
these proposals on both legal and practical grounds. For example, the MLB
Panel believed that club owners could achieve closing the salary scale between
rich and poor clubs unilaterally and without player approval. However, the
Flood Act specifically prohibits MLB from employing anti-competitive
practices that are "directly relating to or affecting" MLB player
employment. 168 This statutory language would appear to cover the level of
player salaries. Therefore, the MLB Panel proposal may violate the terms of
the Flood Act.
On a more practical matter, "it will be difficult for the players to accept
changes in an economic system that [as of the 2000 season] has resulted in an
average salary of $1.8 million."' 169 Most commentators have noted that a
change in baseball's economic system likely will depress player salaries. 170
Costas contends that only top-level stars would be affected because they
would not be able to earn annual salaries in excess of approximately ten
million dollars under his system. 171 The salaries paid to top players, however,
are like rising tides that lift other players' salaries as well. 172 Conversely,
when the tide drops (i.e., when top-level salaries are reduced), other players'
salaries will drop as well. Thus, because the players must approve of any
168. 15 U.S.C. § 27a(a).
169. T.R. Sullivan, Commissioner Short on Details of Possible Economic Overhaul, ARLINGTON
STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 26, 2000, at 13C. Sullivan continues, "[w]ho cares if the New York Yankees
are buying the World Series every year if the Philadelphia Phillies are willing to pay Jose Mesa $6.8
million over two years?" Id.
170. Sen. Mike DeWine specifically asked Commissioner Selig during his testimony before
Congress: "Isn't it going to depress wages?" Blum, supra note 135.
171. COSTAS, supra note 44, at 95 (describing his "superstar" salary cap formula, which is equal
to one-fourth the minimum team salary); The "superstar salary cap" proposed by Costas is discussed
supra note 110.
172. As sportswriter Simon Gonzalez noted,
[Texas Rangers General Manager Doug] Melvin is concerned that teams that miss out on [signing top-tier
free agents] will drive up the price on the so-called second tier free agents .... "That could be a danger,
that the salary for the second-tier type player goes up a little more than you're willing to pay," Melvin
said.
Simon Gonzalez, Free Agents Are Big Topic at GM Meeting, ARLINGTON STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 5,
2000, at 12C.
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substantial change to the salary system, MLB must find a way, to paraphrase
Commissioner Selig, to ensure that the industry restructures in the right way so
that doing so does not have the effect of depressing salaries. 173
Niagara Mohawk took a two-step approach with the IPPs involved in the
MRA. First, it bought down or bought out existing above-market contracts so
that the rates it paid were more in line with market rates. MLB should take a
similar approach to existing player contracts. For example, suppose the Los
Angeles Dodgers want to buy down the above-market portion of its contract
with Kevin Brown. Brown's current contract runs through 2005 and pays him
fifteen million dollars a season. If the Dodgers want to restructure the contract
to pay Brown eight million dollars a season, it could pay Brown an amount
equal to the net present value of the seven million dollars a year difference
through the term of the contract. Using a discount rate of ten percent, for
example, this lump-sum payment would equal $24.41 million.174 Brown
benefits from this structure because he receives a substantial percentage of his
contract value up-front and limits his exposure to the risk that an injury might
prematurely end his career.
Once the MLB clubs negotiate the respective buy-outs, the liabilities
should be shifted to the central entity, much like Niagara's T&D utility carried
the debt burden associated with the MRA. MLB further could follow Niagara
Mohawk's lead and seek to raise funds to pay for the buy-outs through a
public bond offering. Thus, with this structure, MLB would be able to convert
escalating off-balance sheet obligations into a fixed and manageable capital
obligation. Furthermore, MLB's clubs would be better positioned to put
together a competitive team within the forty-to-eighty million dollar annual
salary range.
The second step that Niagara took was to give the IPPs an equity interest
in the company. Such an approach is not feasible in the context of MLB, but
the concept of tying the players' and owners' interests together can be
achieved through profit sharing.175 Under the current salary system, player
wages constitute fixed obligations for MLB clubs. But under a profit-sharing
173. In response to Senator DeWine's question regarding the possibility of depressing wages,
Selig said, "I think if we as an industry do this right, I don't think it has that effect at all." Blum,
supra note 135.
174. This would cover the period 2002 to 2005 and assumes a payout in 2002. The discount rate
used here is for illustrative purposes. The actual rate likely would need to be negotiated between the
owners and players union and would need to take into account such factors as MLB's cost of capital,
the possibility of injury, and other relevant risk factors.
175. Randy Galloway, Exit Polls Show Baseball Needs Our Help, ARLINGTON STAR-
TELEGRAM, Nov. 10, 2000, at ID ("Salaries won't be curbed until the players' union is made a full
partner on the business side of baseball, with owners and players sharing equal in a combined pot of
profits.").
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plan, player compensation would become more variable and more market-
driven. This would be consistent with the emphasis of moving away from the
current system in which teams pay more for players' services than they can
afford.
Under this plan, all players would share any profits generated from the
central entity, while players on specific teams would also share in that team's
individual profits as well. 176 Thus, player compensation would be based on a
combination of fixed priced contracts that fall within forty-to-eighty million
dollar range per team, 177 and a variable bonus based on the profit-sharing plan.
As Costas notes, the forty-to-eighty million dollar salary range increases the
total amount paid to all players over current salaries, 178 while adding profit-
sharing on top of that would provide the players with the economic incentive
to agree to the new system.
E. Reviewing the Proposal
In summary, the proposal offered in this article is: for MLB to take
advantage of its monopoly status by consolidating certain expenses and team
debt, implementing a revenue sharing system, reducing the team payroll
differential to a range of forty-to-eighty million dollars, buying down current
above-market player contracts, and implementing a profit-sharing plan with
the players. These are the principles that MLB should follow in restructuring
its economic system. They offer a system that, if properly designed, will
enhance profitability and get the support of club owners and players. Many of
the specifics still need to be resolved; to do so requires access to an extensive
amount of financial data that is not publicly available. In developing the
specifics, new methods may be found to improve upon the principles set forth
here. The bottom line, however, is that the business of baseball will be
improved.
176. The MLB owners and MLBPA would need to negotiate the percentage of profits that would
go from the owners (both collectively through the central entity and individually) to the players on an
aggregate basis. The specific allocation of profits among the players is something that the MLBPA
would need to negotiate with its members.
177. Recall that the MLB Panel focused on this range specifically while Costas suggested a
formula that would increase over time based on broadcast revenue. Under the proposal offered here,
either approach could be used. If the MLB Panel approach is followed, the increased broadcasting
revenue would flow through to the players through the profit sharing plan. If MLB employed Costas'
formula, the increased revenue would be available to the players under their contracts.
178. COSTAS, supra note 44, at 93. The salary structure proposed by Costas is discussed supra
note 110.
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IV. IN THE CLEAN-UP SPOT: DOES THE PROPOSED SYSTEM IMPROVE MLB'S
COMPETITIVE BALANCE?
The proposed system offers incentives to club owners and players to agree
to the change. But the question remains regarding MLB's third constituency,
its fans-will baseball become more competitive as a result of this change?
Although competitive balance may be an inappropriate end of restructuring, it
is the component that MLB's customers care most about. It is also the issue
that Congress would likely pay closest attention to as it continues to monitor
the industry. Much like Niagara Mohawk faced the issue of how to provide
quality services to its customers at cheaper prices, MLB faces the problem of
how to deliver a quality product to its consumers at prices they are willing to
pay.
The system proposed here improves the quality of on-the-field
competition in a number of ways, including but not limited to:
0 The payroll differential between rich and poor clubs will be
reduced such that the highest base payroll will be only two times that
of the lowest payroll;
0 Overall player development will be improved by consolidating
MLB's development resources and using them more efficiently;
* Clubs and players alike have incentives to field competitive teams,
because doing so would increase attendance, thereby increasing profits
to share between clubs and players; and
* The economic restructuring here can be implemented with other
proposals to improve competitiveness, such as the MLB Panel's
suggestions regarding the Rule 4 draft.
In addition, because teams will not be burdened with as many escalating
costs, clubs would feel less financial pressure to raise ticket prices, thereby
allowing MLB to continue its "traditional position as the affordable family
spectator sport."179
The result of this restructuring would be that the off-the-field business of
baseball would be on solid ground as would MLB's labor relations with its
players. Thus, the business of baseball could once again recede to the
background, and the on-the-field game of baseball could be the primary focus
of clubs, players, and fans alike. As Hall of Fame baseball announcer Mel
Allen used to say, "How about that!"
179. PANEL REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
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V. THE POST-GAME SHOW: A POSTSCRIPT IN THE WAKE OF THE 2001-2002
OFF-SEASON
The previous sections of this article were written before the start of the
2001 MLB season. During 2001, the Minnesota Twins, who maintained the
lowest payroll in MLB, surprised many by holding first place in the American
League Central Division throughout a good portion of the season. 180 The
Oakland A's, another team in the lowest payroll quartile, mounted an
impressive surge in the second half of the season ending the year with more
than one-hundred victories and nabbing the American League Wild Card.' 8
1
Despite these "success" stories, the overall relationship that has persisted since
1995 between payroll and on-the-field success, particularly in the post-season,
continued. Seven of the eight playoff teams in 2001 were in either the first or
second quartile of payroll. 182 These clubs won 33 of the 35 post-season
games, bringing the total number of post-season wins since 1995 by clubs in
the top two quartiles to 219 victories in 224 games. 183
Perhaps the most significant news regarding baseball's economics is not
what happened on the field during the 2001 season, but what happened off of
it following the World Series: MLB owners approved the contraction of two
clubs, 184 but that effort ultimately failed; 185 Congress considered legislation
revoking portions of MLB's antitrust exemption, and both the Senate and the
House of Representatives held hearings on the issue; 186 MLB detailed
significant losses among its clubs, a total of $232 million in operating losses
for 2001;187 the owner of the Florida Marlins bought part of the Boston Red
180. Mel Antonen & Chuck Johnson, Being Competitive at Half the Cost, USA TODAY, Mar. 5,
2002, at 8C.
181. Id.
182. Hal Bodley, Six Playoff Temas Make Top 10 in Payroll; Yankees Tops at $143M, USA
TODAY, Oct. 9, 2001, at 4C.
183. Selig's Testimony, Submitted in Advance, MLB.COM (Dec. 6, 2001), available at
http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mob/mlb/news/mlbnewsstory.jsp?article id=mlb_20011206_seligte
stimonynews&team_id=mlb. See also Post Season Games Won by Payroll Quartile 1995-2001,
MLB.COM, available at
http://www.mlb.com/mlb/hearings/downloads/postseasongamesbypayroll.pdf (last visited Apr.
17, 2002).
184. Hal Bodley, Talking Contraction, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, ,2002, at 6C.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Sox, 188 the owner of the Montreal Expos bought the Marlins, 189 and Major
League Baseball itself bought the Expos. 190 Despite the flurry of activity,
however, not much has changed at least as of the time this article went to
press; MLB looked at the start of the 2002 season much as it did at the end of
the 2001 season, with thirty teams, labor troubles looming, and an uncertain
economic future.
As noted above, the principles of the economic structure set forth in this
article would work in conjunction with other efforts to improve MLB's
competitiveness and economic strength. This also would be true with the steps
that MLB took or attempted during the 2001-2002 off-season. In fact, MLB's
attempt at contraction and its taking ownership of the Expos put into effect
some of the principles promoted herein. The logic underlying contraction,
specifically eliminating the Expos and the Minnesota Twins (and, as some
owners reportedly wanted, an additional two teams), is to remove teams that
have been continuous drains on the revenue-sharing system-that is, teams
that year in and year out receive more money under the current revenue-
sharing system than they put in.191 For example, in 2001, Montreal received a
net payment from revenue sharing of $28.517 million and Minnesota received
a net payment of $19.069 million. 192 These amounts represent the largest two
net payments to any club during 2001.193 If these teams were contracted, the
$47.586 million paid to these clubs could be distributed among the remaining
twenty-eight clubs, thereby increasing their net cash position on average by
$1.7 million. Like most other economic reform proposals, taken by itself, this
amount is not that significant. But as one part of a comprehensive plan for
improving MLB's overall economic strength, contraction would aid in
enhancing the profitability of the remaining clubs.
Another key principle to reforming MLB's economic structure suggested
in this article is for MILB to centralize many of its functions. MLB took
important steps during the 2001-2002 off-season that demonstrate the viability
of such coordinated action. Under the contraction proposal, MLB would have
188. Hal Bodley, MlB Expected to Approve Expos Bosses Today, USA TODAY, Feb. 12,2002, at
6C.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Peter Schmuck, Baseball Expands on Idea of Reduction, BALTIMoRE SuN, Nov. 6,2001, at
ID.
192. Michael Urban, Revenue Sharing: How it Works, Is It Working?, MLB.com (Dec. 6, ,2001),
available at
http:llwww.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb_news_story.jsp?articleid=mlb_20011206_urban2
_news&team_id=mlb.
193. Id.
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bought out the owners of the eliminated teams.194 In reality, MLB did just this
in regard to the Expos (even though the team was not contracted for the 2002
season). MLB, through a set of executives that it appointed, will run the
Expos for at least the 2002 season. MLB has shown that it can affirmatively
use its central organization to try to enhance the overall profitability of the
industry; it should be willing to take additional steps along these lines.
Moreover, these actions reflect that MLB should be given the opportunity to
coordinate its response to its economic problems, now that it is doing so, and
that Congress should not repeal MLB's antitrust exemption in any fashion.
Such a repeal would merely impede MLB's ability to mold an economic
solution that ultimately may provide benefits to all interested constituencies.
The issue of the antitrust exemption, however, along with contraction,
team finances, operating losses, etc., will continue to be a part of baseball's
lexicon. So long as they remain unresolved, they will continue to be central to
any discussion of MLB's future. The main part of this article ended with a
quotation from a Hall-of-Famer closely associated with the Yankees.
Likewise, I will end this postscript with the words of wisdom of another
Yankee Hall-of-Famer, that great baseball philosopher Yogi Berra: "It ain't
over till its over."
194. Schmuck, supra note 19 1.
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